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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, * 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : Case No. 920346-CA 
v. : Priority No. 15 
THOMAS C. JACKSON, i 
Defendant/Appellee. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a dismissal of fourteen counts 
of theft, all class B misdemeanors, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990), in the Sixth Judicial District Court, in 
and for Garfield County, State of Utah, the Honorable Don V. 
Tibbs, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction to hear this case 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(2)(a) (Supp. 1992) and Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The sole issue presented in this appeal is: 
1. Did the trial court properly grant defendant's 
motion for a directed verdict, finding that the State had failed 
to present "some evidence," sufficient to make a prima facie case 
of theft? "In directing a verdict, the court is not free to 
weigh the evidence and thus invade the province of the jury, 
whose prerogative it is to judge the facts. A directed verdict 
is only appropriate when the court is able to conclude, as a 
matter of law, that reasonable minds would not differ on the 
facts to be determined from the evidence presented. [The 
appellate] Court's standard of review of a directed verdict is 
the same as that imposed upon the trial court. [The appellate 
court] must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the losing party, and if there is a reasonable basis in the 
evidence and in the inferences to be drawn therefrom that would 
support a judgment in favor of the losing party, the directed 
verdict cannot be sustained." Management Committee, etc. v. 
Gravstone Pines, 652 P.2d 896, 897-98 (Utah 1982) (footnotes 
omitted). The trial court's determination concerning a motion to 
dismiss or for a directed verdict is a question of law. State v. 
Rivenburqh, 11 Utah 2d 95, 110, 355 P.2d 689, 698-99 (1960), 
cert, denied, 386 U.S. 922, 82 S* Ct. 246 (1961). The trial 
court's legal conclusion is not accorded any particular deference 
and is reviewed for its correctness. City of Monticello v. 
Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah 1990), cert, denied. 111 S. 
Ct. 120 (1990). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Determinative constitutional provisions, statutes and 
rules are compiled in Addendum A where not set forth in the body 
of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Thomas C. Jackson, was charged by amended 
information with eighteen counts of theft, all class B 
misdemeanors, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990) 
2 
(R. 84-89). At defendant's jury trial, counts I and II were 
dismissed with prejudice by stipulation (Order of dismissal, 
hereinafter "order," R. 152, attached at Addendum A; T. 70). 
Counts XVI and XVII were dismissed because evidence showed that 
property alleged to have been taken was inaccessible to defendant 
(R. 152-53; T. 200-02). The trial court granted defendant's 
motion for a directed verdict on the remaining counts, finding 
that the State failed to present a prima facie case of theft 
against defendant (R. 153; T. 200-05). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant was hired in early August 1990 as a laborer 
by Harper Construction Company, which was then doing work on the 
Burr Trail outside of Boulder and Escalante, Utah (T. 123). 
Approximately one and one-half weeks later he was hired as a 
security guard by the company at $7.00 per hour without 
"subsistence," i.e., travel expenses (T. 124-26). His shift ran 
from 7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. (T. 127). 
A couple of hours before dark on the last Saturday of 
September 1990, Grant Johnson drove up to the jobsite on a 
motorcycle with Harper employee Susan Ferron seated behind him 
(T. 85-86, 115). They saw defendant standing between his truck 
and horse trailer (pictured in State's Ex. 1 and 2), which were 
parallel to a diesel fuel tanker (pictured in State's Ex. 4), 
with the nozzle from the tanker fuel hose in his hands (T. 87, 
115). Johnson testified that defendant was holding the hose in 
the horse trailer and that when defendant observed he and Ferron 
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approaching, defendant withrew the hose from the trailer and 
threw it to the ground (T. 115-16). Although neither Johnson and 
Ferron saw fuel coming from the nozzle nor heard the tanker fuel 
pump running, Johnson observed defendant reach around to the 
front of the tanker where the pump was located (T. 98, 103-04, 
116, 119). On cross examination Ferron noted that when the pump 
was running the fuel came out of the hose really fast and that 
she was not aware of any fuel around (T. 96, 102). They also 
both testified that the hose nozzle appeared too large to fit 
into the tank of an ordinary pickup truck (T. 96, 120). 
Ferron had seen defendant pull his horse trailer to 
work on many occasions, though only once carrying horses (T. 92). 
She was not aware at the time she witnessed defendant's acts that 
he had a fuel tank in the back of his horse trailer (T. 90). 
When she was told about the tank, she told Donald Haws, 
superintendent for Harper, about what she and Johnson had seen 
(T. 91). 
Haws did not immediately confront defendant, wanting 
instead to catch him in the act of stealing (T. 129). On January 
9, 1991, at about 8:00 p.m., Haws and Billie Jones drove onto the 
jobsite in one of the company diesel trucks (T. 130, 154, 172). 
They saw defendant holding the fuel tanker nozzle into a funnel 
inserted into the fuel tank located in the back of defendant's 
horse trailer (T. 130, 154, 178). When defendant became aware of 
Haws' and Jones' approaching headlights, he began to hang up the 
hose on the fuel tanker. He appeared very nervous (T. 131, 173). 
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Both witnesses testified that the pump was running (T. 131, 178). 
Haws testified the sound of the pump could be heard over the 
noise of the diesel truck, and upon their approach defendant was 
moving to shut it off (T. 131, 154). 
Jones testified that defendant was filling his fuel 
tank with the fuel from the fuel tanker, although neither she nor 
Haws saw fuel on defendant, and Jones did not actually see fuel 
running (T. 155-56, 172, 178). However, when defendant walked up 
to Haws, still seated in the truck, and Haws accused him of 
"stealing fuel from us," defendant offered Haws his paycheck, 
explaining that he was "stealing" six to nine gallons of fuel 
because he was a poor man and could not afford to pay the fuel 
cost of traveling to and from the jobsite (T. 132, 162-64, 173). 
Both Haws and Jones assumed at the time that defendant's 
admission of the amount of fuel he was stealing was a reference 
to a daily amount, but at trial Jones appeared to acknowledge 
that it was probably a reference to a weekly amount because it 
would take that much to go from Escalante to the jobsite and back 
(T. 163, 176). Jones thought that defendant offered his check to 
cover the cost of the fuel that he had taken (T. 173, 177). On 
cross examination Haws said that defendant offered him the check 
because he was sorry about the mistake, but on direct examination 
Haws had testified that: "[Defendant] offered me his last 
paycheck to keep it quiet" (T. 162, 169). Haws refused the 
check, and fired defendant (T. 132, 161). 
Haws testified that only he had authority to allow an 
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employee to use fuel. He allowed employees to use fuel in their 
personal vehicles when they used them for company businessf but 
only after they had come to him each time when they needed fuel 
(T. 128, 139, 169). That policy was announced at the weekly 
safety meetings (T. 139). Defendant was present at a safety 
meeting at least one time, during his initial employment as a 
laborer on the pipe crew, though apparently not thereafter when 
employed as a security guard (T. 139). 
Haws acknowledged, through defendant's exhibit 7, that 
as much as one hundred sixty-one gallons of fuel per week, on 
average during the period of defendant's employment, was given to 
employees for the use of their vehicles in performing company 
business (T. 141-48). Haws approved defendant's taking a tank of 
fuel on only one occasion, when defendant was using his truck to 
spread pipe, carry bands and do other odds and ends (T. 128). 
Also, defendant was permitted to use whatever vehicle he wanted 
in his job as a security guard. Haws acknowledged that defendant 
would be entitled to receive fuel if he were using his truck for 
company business, i.e., patrolling the area as security guard. 
However, defendant would still have to approach Haws each time he 
needed fuel (T. 141, 152). While Haws admitted the possibility 
that defendant might have misunderstood him concerning his having 
to come to him each time he needed fuel, he stated at several 
points that he did not believe that defendant could have had such 
an impression (T. 137-38, 140, 150, 169). Haws testified that 
defendant never asked for fuel while he was a security guard, 
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that in negotiations for defendant's employment he (Haws) made no 
agreement to provide defendant with fuel to patrol looking for 
vehicles, and that he did not give defendant any continuing right 
to take fuel after the first occasion on which he had allowed 
defendant to take fuel (T. 168). Haws also testified that for 
all he knew, defendant's truck was parked all night (T. 163). 
After satisfying the trial court that defendant had 
been properly Mirandized,1 Celeste Bernards, Garfield County 
police officer, testified that defendant admitted that he had 
taken between six and eight gallons of fuel per week, just what 
it would take to go from Escalante to Boulder (T. 188-92). She 
also said that defendant told her that he had authority to take 
fuel from several individuals, including Haws, but that she did 
not believe him (T. 192, 194-195). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court made an error of law in finding that 
the State had failed to make a prima facie case of theft and in 
thereby dismissing counts III through XV and XVIII of the amended 
information with prejudice. The question of whether there is 
sufficient evidence, i.e., "some evidence," to support a verdict 
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is for the jury, not for the 
trial court, in a jury trial. 
In this case there was undisputed evidence that 
defendant unauthorizedly took fuel from his employer to reimburse 
himself for his travel expenses to and from the jobsite. 
1
 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966). 
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Defendant had been hired without provision for reimbursement for 
travel expenses, and he never sought nor apparently contemplated 
permission to take fuel to reimburse himself for travel expenses. 
Four witnesses saw defendant in circumstances which reasonably 
suggested that he was taking fuel, and defendant admitted taking 
fuel for travel expenses, once when caught at the fuel station, 
and later when he admitted such taking to a police officer. Such 
evidence more than amply established a prima facie case of theft. 
The trial court, however, was distracted by weakly 
disputed evidence that defendant might reasonably have thought he 
had authorization to take fuel for another purpose, i.e., 
reimbursement for performing company work while using his own 
vehicle. Even on this point the State presented sufficient 
evidence to show defendant's unauthorized taking. In any event, 
this disputed question was a matter for the jury, not the trial 
court. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ACTED AS FACT 
FINDER IN GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A 
DIRECTED VERDICT WHERE THERE WAS SUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE TO TAKE THE CASE TO THE JURY. 
At the close of the State's case the trial court 
dismissed counts XVI and XVII because evidence showed that the 
fuel tanks were locked up and, therefore, inaccessible to 
defendant between December 22, 1990 and January 3, 1991 (Order, 
R. 152-53, attached at Addendum B; T. 200-02). The trial court 
also granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the 
remaining counts, finding that the State failed to present a 
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prima facie case of theft against defendant (R. 153; T. 199-206, 
colloquy on motion for directed verdict, attached at Addendum C). 
"A defendant's motion to dismiss for insufficient 
evidence at the conclusion of the State's case in chief requires 
the trial court to determine whether the defendant must proceed 
with the introduction of evidence in his defense." State v. 
Noren, 704 P.2d 568, 570 (Utah 1985) (per curiam) (citing State 
v. Smith, Utah, 675 P.2d 521 (1983)). See also Utah R. Crim. P. 
17(o);2 Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-3 (1990)3. "In order to submit a 
question to the jury, it is necessary that the prosecution 
present some evidence of every element needed to make out a cause 
of action." Noren, ibid, (citing State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 
(Utah 1976)); State v. Striebv, 790 P.2d 98, 100 (Utah App. 
1990), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). 
"[U]pon a motion to dismiss or to direct a verdict of 
not guilty for lack of evidence [] the trial court does not 
2
 Rule 17, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides, in 
pertinent part: 
(o) At the conclusion of the evidence by 
the prosecution, or at the conclusion of all 
the evidence, the court may issue an order 
dismissing any information or indictment, or 
any count thereof, upon the ground that the 
evidence is not legally sufficient to 
establish the offense charged therein or any 
lesser included offense. 
3
 Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-3 (1990), provides: 
When it appears to the court that there is 
not sufficient evidence to put a defendant to 
his defense, it shall forthwith order him 
discharged. 
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consider the weight of the evidence or credibility of the 
witnesses, but determines the naked legal proposition of law . • 
. ." Rivenburah, 11 Utah 2d at 110, 355 P.2d at 698-99 (1960) 
(quoting State v. Penderville, 2 Utah 2d 281, 186, 272 P.2d 195, 
198 (1954). 
"The controlling principle is that upon [a motion to 
dismiss] the evidence is to be viewed most favorably to the 
state, and if when so viewed, the jury acting fairly and 
reasonably could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt, the judge is required to submit the case to the jury for 
determination of the guilt or innocence of defendant." State v. 
Iverson, 10 Utah 2d 171, 173, 350 P.2d 152, 153 (1960) (emphasis 
added). 
A challenge alleging insufficient evidence to warrant 
sending a case to the jury is reviewed under the same standard 
applied to a claim that insufficient evidence exists to support a 
jury verdict. State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 1989) 
(cited for this proposition in State v. Taylor. 818 P.2d 561, 
573-74 (Utah App. 1991): "[The appellate court] will uphold the 
trial court's decision if, upon reviewing the evidence and all 
inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it, [the appellate 
court] concludefs] that some evidence exists from which a 
reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had 
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Ibid, (rejecting the 
defendant's claim that the trial court had erred in denying his 
motion to dismiss). 
10 
The Utah Supreme Court has applied the same standard in 
evaluating a trial court's granting of a motion for a directed 
verdict: 
In directing a verdict, the court is not 
free to weigh the evidence and thus invade 
the province of the jury, whose prerogative 
it is to judge the facts. A directed verdict 
is only appropriate when the court is able to 
conclude, as a matter of law, that reasonable 
minds would not differ on the facts to be 
determined from the evidence presented. 
[The appellate] Court's standard of 
review of a directed verdict is the same as 
that imposed upon the trial court. [The 
appellate court] must examine the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the losing party, 
and if there is a reasonable basis in the 
evidence and in the inferences to be drawn 
therefrom that would support a judgment in 
favor of the losing party, the directed 
verdict cannot be sustained. 
Management Committee, etc.. 652 P.2d at 897-98; Cruz v. Montova, 
660 P.2d 723, 729 (Utah 1983) ("Unless the evidence is wholly 
lacking and incapable of reasonable inference to prove some issue 
which supports the plaintiff's claim, a court should not direct a 
verdict for the defendant.") 
Since the trial court's determination concerning a 
motion to dismiss or for a directed verdict is a question of law, 
Rivenburgh, 11 Utah 2d at 110, 355 P.2d at 698-99, it is subject 
to a correction of error standard. City of Monticello, 788 P.2d 
at 516. 
In State v. Thatcher, 108 Utah 63, 157 P.2d 258 (1945), 
the defendant had been charged with involuntary manslaughter 
stemming from an automobile accident in which there was 
11 
conflicting evidence as to whether the defendant had recklessly-
caused the accident. The trial court granted the defendant's 
motion to dismiss at the conclusion of the State's case, and the 
State appealed. In finding the evidence sufficient to make out a 
prima facie case and in reversing the trial court's ruling, the 
majority stated the proper functions of the trial court versus 
the jury: 
When different reasonable inferences can be 
drawn from the evidence, the question is one 
exclusively within the province of the iurv. 
It is not the function of the court to 
substitute its judgment on questions of fact 
for that of the iurv. 
Id. at 68, 157 P.2d at 260 (emphasis added). This distinction 
was developed at length in the concurring opinion of Justice 
Wolfe, instructive in the instant case: 
. . • The rule which must be applied upon a 
motion to dismiss a criminal case is that all 
reasonable inferences are to be taken in 
favor of the state, and only if the record 
itself reveals that no reasonable man could 
draw an inference of guilt therefrom is the 
trial court justified in taking the case from 
the jury. No such situation is revealed by 
this record. 
So important is it that the above be 
understood and that there be no confusion 
regarding it that it may perhaps pay to 
resort again to first principles. It is 
common place in our system of jurisprudence 
that the court decides only questions of law 
and the jury questions of fact. Each has its 
judging functions and each is an equally 
important department of the judicial 
institution we call the court. Neither is 
supposed to trespass in the province of the 
other. This is so fundamental that no 
authority need be cited for it. In this case 
it is requisite that we determine the line 
separating the functions of each. Ordinarily 
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we sav that it is for the jury and not the 
court to 'weigh' the evidence. That means 
that where there is anv substantial evidence 
to go to the jury in favor of both sides it 
must go to the jury so that the iurv may put 
all the evidence for one party on one scale 
and balance it against the evidence for the 
other party placed on the other scale. 
The judge has very little to do with this 
process. He determines whether offered 
testimony has anv probative force, i.e., 
whether it tends to prove or disprove an 
element of the case and according to that 
judgment he admits or rejects it. Once 
admitted it is for the jury. 
There are, of course, situations under 
which the case should not be submitted to a 
jury. One of these would be where there was 
no substantial evidence (and that does not 
mean a substantial amount of evidence but 
substantial in the sense of having 
substance). Perhaps also in the rare case 
where there can be no doubt that testimony of 
all witnesses as to one or more essential 
elements in the case appears from the record 
to be so inherently improbable that no 
reasonable man could give weight to it the 
case could be taken from the jury. But 'mere 
contradictions of the testimony of a witness 
will not suffice to constitute inherent 
improbability or to destroy its weight' so as 
to justify a court in disregarding such 
testimony. Perhaps in the case where there 
is a mountain of evidence on one side as 
against a molehill on the other all of equal 
quality as shown by the record so that no 
jury of reasonable men could determine 
otherwise than for the preponderance the case 
might be taken from the jury, but the 
preponderance would have to be overwhelming. 
Also in criminal cases the case may be taken 
from the jury where it can be said beyond 
doubt that no reasonable men could find the 
defendant guilty without entertaining a 
reasonable doubt. 
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In determining whether or not a case is 
to go to the jury, the trial judge has no 
discretion. If the evidence falls into one 
of the above enumerated categories the judge 
should not submit it to the jury. If the 
evidence under any reasonable interpretation 
would sustain a verdict of guilty, the judge 
is required to let the case go to the iurv. 
Id. at 74-78, 157 P.2d at 263-64 (Wolfe, J., concurring) 
(citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
In this case the State presented evidence, which when 
viewed most favorably for the prosecution, was amply sufficient 
to establish a prima facie case of theft. Therefore, even if 
there were evidence in opposition to the State's case, the trial 
court was required to deny defendant's motion for a directed 
verdict and send the case to the jury. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990), states that M[a] 
person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized 
control over the property of another with a purpose to deprive 
him thereof." 
On one occasion two witnesses saw defendant with the 
fuel hose in his hand as he stood next to his horse trailer which 
contained a fuel tank (T 87, 115). As the witnesses approached, 
Johnson saw defendant withdraw the hose from the trailer, throw 
it to the ground and immediately start talking to Ferron (T. 115-
16). While neither of these witnesses heard the pump running or 
observed the flow of fuel, Johnson saw defendant reach around the 
front of the tanker where the fuel pump was located as they 
approached (T. 98, 103-04, 116, 119). The implication of all of 
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defendant's movements suggested an intent to hide what might 
reasonably be inferred from his actions, to wit: he was taking 
fuel without permission. 
On the second occasion two other witnesses, including 
Harper's superintendent, saw defendant again standing next to his 
horse trailer, holding the fuel hose into his trailer. This time 
there was a funnel in the fuel tank and the pump was running (T. 
130, 154, 172, 178). As soon as defendant became aware that he 
was being observed, he hung up the hose and shut off the pump (T. 
131, 154, 173). When confronted directly, defendant, appearing 
"very nervous," admitted taking six to nine gallons of fuel 
because he was a poor man and could not afford the expense of 
traveling to and from the jobsite and offered up his last 
paycheck (T. 132, 162-64, 173). 
The testimony was undisputed that when defendant was 
hired as a security guard he was not entitled to receive 
subsistence, i.e., traveling expenses to and from the jobsite (T. 
125-26). Approximately a week after his firing, he admitted to a 
police officer that he had been "taking" six to eight gallons of 
fuel each week of his employment only to cover the expense of his 
traveling to and from the jobsite (T. 192). It is apparent, both 
from the character of defendant's cross examination of the 
State's witnesses and from the evidence adduced by both parties, 
that defendant never contemplated as a defense that he had 
authorization to take fuel for travel expenses. 
There are no material facts controverting those set out 
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above, which clearly make out a prima facie case of theft, to 
wit: an unauthorized taking of property with intent to deprive 
the owner thereof. 
Interestingly, a substantial portion of the testimony 
was directed to whether defendant had authorization to take fuel 
for an altogether different purpose, i.e., performing his duties 
as security guard. The amended information charged defendant 
with the unauthorized taking of six to eight gallons of fuel per 
week (R. 84-89). It is obvious that the evidence supporting the 
amended information were defendant's admissions, both to Haws and 
to Officer Bernards, that he had taken these amounts to pay his 
travel expenses to and from the jobsite. In the face of these 
admissions, evidence concerning whether or not he had 
authorization to take fuel to perform his job is irrelevant and 
only served to distract the trial court from defendant's 
uncontested unauthorized taking of fuel for travel expenses. 
Even if the question of authorization to take fuel for 
work related purposes were relevant, there would have been 
sufficient evidence on this point to take the case to the jury. 
Only Haws could authorize the taking of fuel, and he gave 
defendant permission to take fuel only once, i.e., while 
defendant worked on the pipe crew and was using his truck for 
company work (T. 128-29). Defendant was present for at least one 
weekly meeting in which Haws announced the company policy of 
allowing fuel reimbursements for doing company work, though only 
with his permission on each occasion (T. 139-41). Haws' 
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testimony makes clear that he never contemplated that defendant 
would be supplied with fuel in connection with his suseguent 
duties as security guard and that defendant could not reasonably 
have believed that he would be so supplied (T. 137-41, 150, 169). 
Haws was doubtful that defendant did use his truck to patrol the 
jobsite as security guard (T. 163), and, in fact, there was no 
evidence that defendant did use his truck in this way. 
In this case the trial court acted in clear 
contravention of those principles defining the proper roles of a 
trial court and jury outlined by Judge Wolfe in Thatcher (see 
Appellant's Brief at 13-14). Evidence of the trial court's 
erroneous application of the correct legal standards was its 
reliance on Jones' testimony that defendant had hung up the hose 
on the second occasion, apparently sparking the trial court's 
belief that defendant was not thereby exhibiting a guilty mind, 
and on Haws' testimony that defendant might have made a mistake 
about whether he had authorization to take fuel in working as a 
security guard (T. 203-04). Such interpretations of the evidence 
were fact determinations for the jury, not the trial court. 
Management Committee, etc., 652 P.2d at 897-98; Cruz v. Montova, 
660 P.2d at 729. 
Indeed, the trial court's evaluations were likely a 
substantial misreading of the evidence. Jones testified that 
defendant "was filling his fuel tank with the fuel from the fuel 
truck," that defendant did not immediately recognize their 
approach and that when he did he hung up the hose (T. 172-73, 
17 
178). Any reasonable juror, contrary to the trial court's 
apparent belief, might have assumed that either defendant had 
already completed the taking of fuel on that occasion, or that, 
recognizing the approach of his boss in such uncompromising 
circumstances, the wisest thing was not to try to hide one's 
guilt. Defendant's immediate walking up to Haws and his ready 
offer of his paycheck suggest that his hanging up the hose 
signaled an acquiescence in the discovery of his misdeeds. As to 
the trial court's seizing on the possibility of defendant's 
mistaken belief about his right to take fuel to patrol the 
jobsite, the record is clear that Haws was very ably badgered 
into this acknowledgment by defense counsel, but that Haws 
personally did not believe that defendant could reasonably 
believe that he was authorized to take fuel in performance of his 
security guard duties (T. 137-38, 140, 150, 169). Again, the 
weight to be accorded such testimony was not for the trial court 
to determine, but for the jury. Ibid. 
The clearest signal of the trial court's erroneously 
depriving the jury of the opportunity to decide this case is the 
trial court's statement that even if the jury were to convict 
defendant, it would feel compelled to grant a motion for a 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict (T. 204). Thus, the trial 
court dismissed the case with prejudice on a theory which 
presumed that defendant's case had already been presented to the 
jury and that in spite of a possible conviction there existed no 
evidence upon which defendant could have been convicted. A 
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dismissal based on that assumption was outside the province of 
the trial court. Rivenburah, 11 Utah 2d at 110, 355 P.2d at 698-
99; Iverson, 10 Utah 2d at 173, 350 P.2d at 153; Thatcher, 108 
Utah at 68, 157 P.2d at 260. 
In sum, the trial court improperly perceived tis role 
to be a fact finder in a jury trial, thereby curtailing a proper 
assessment of the evidence. As a matter of law, the trial court 
erred in dismissing with prejudice counts III through XV and 
XVIII of the amended information. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully requests 
this Court to reverse the trial court's dismissal of counts III 
through XV and XVIII of the amended information and to remand the 
case for further proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /7 day of December, 1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Appellant were mailed, postage prepaid, to 
E. Kent Winward, Garfield County Public Defender, attorney for 
appellee, 36 North 300 West, Cedar City, Utah 84720, this /» } 
day of December, 1992. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
77-18a-l. Appeals — When proper. 
(1) An appeal may be taken by the defendant from: 
(a) the final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea; 
(b) an order made after judgment that afifects the substantial rights of 
the defendant; 
(c) an interlocutory order when upon petition for review the appellate 
court decides the appeal would be in the interest of justice; or 
(d) any order of the court judging the defendant by reason of a mental 
disease or defect incompetent to proceed further in a pending prosecution. 
(2) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution from: 
(a) a final judgment of dismissal; 
(b) an order arresting judgment; 
(c) an order terminating the prosecution because of a finding of double 
jeopardy or denial of a speedy trial; 
(d) a judgment of the court holding a statute or any part of it invalid; 
(e) an order of the court granting a pretrial motion to suppress evi-
dence when upon a petition for review the appellate court decides that the 
appeal would be in the interest of justice; or 
(f) an order of the court granting a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty 
or no contest. 
ADDENDUM B 
MAT u i rasz 
;— Clerl 
WALLACE A- LEE #5306 
Garfield County Attorney 
55 South Main Street 
Panguitch, Utah 84759 
Telephone: 676-2290 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GARFIELD COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TOM JACKSON, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Criminal No. 91-CR-309 
This matter came before the Court for jury trial on the 19th 
day of March, 1992, the Honorable Don V. Tibbs presiding. 
Defendant was present in Court and was represented by his attorney, 
E. Kent Winvard. The State of Utah was represented by Wallace A. 
Lee, Garfield County Attorney. 
By stipulation of Counsel, Counts I and II of the information 
were dismissed with prejudice. After the jury was impaneled and 
sworn, the Court and jury heard opening statements of counsel and 
testimony of witnesses for the State of Utah. After the State of 
Utah rested its case, Defendant moved for dismissal of Counts XVI 
and XVII, and the motion was granted because during the period of 
time covered by these two Counts, the fuel tank and equipment at 
25. Confinement. 
26 Fine 
Restitution 
Probation End Date 
27. AGENCY REFERRED AP&P U County Jail D State Prison • 
Court Probation D Alcohol Rehab D Mental Health n 
Order 
the site were locked# and Defendant could not have taken fuel from 
them. 
After the Court dismissed Counts XVI and XVII, the Defendant 
moved for a directed verdict on the remaining counts. After 
hearing arguments of Counsel relative to the motion for directed 
verdict, the Court is of the opinion that the State failed to 
present sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case on any 
of the remaining counts of the information. Specifically, the 
Court finds that the State of Utah did not present a prima facie 
case that Defendant took unauthorized control over the property of 
another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
NOW THEREFORE, Defendants motion for a directed verdict is 
granted and this case is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this ?fl day of /&>K. L , 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
ADDENDUM C 
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Honor. 
THE COURT: It's sustained. 
MR. LEE: Okay. 
MR. LEE: No further questions, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Anything further? 
MR. WINWARD: Nothing further, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: That's all. Thank you. 
MR. LEE: And the State rests at this time, Your 
THE COURT: Thank you. You may call your first 
witness. 
MR. WINWARD: Your Honor, could u/e approach the 
Bench for a minute? 
THE COURT: Surely. 
(OFF-RECORD BENCH CONFERENCE] 
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, I'm going to 
send you for a walk. Would you please walk down the hall. 
Once again, again it's the duty of this Court to 
admonish you you're not to talk about this case with anyone. 
You're not to form or express any opinion on the case until 
it's finally submitted to you. 
PROCEEDINGS OUTSIDE THE JURY 
THE COURT: The record should indicate we're 
outside the presence of the jury. I'll hear you, counsel. 
DEFENSE JHOTION POR DIRECTED VERDICT 
MR. WINWARD: Your Honor, at this time I feel it 
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i II would be appropriate, highly appropriate, to move for a 
2 directed verdict at this time. I don't think that the State 
3 has met their case. I don't think they've produced a prima 
* facie case to show that on these 16 separate accounts that 
5 Mr. Jackson took 6 lo 8 gallons of fuel. And I'm prepared 
6 to proceed on that motion, Your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: Go ahead. Proceed. 
8 MR. WINWARD: Okay. 
9 First of all, as far as what the State's put on at 
io this point, Mr. Haws has testified t h a t — l e t me grab the 
n I information here because that's going to be helpful as w e go 
12 through this. 
13 [CHECKED NOTES] 
14 Mr. Haws testified that the tanks were locked up 
15 and that he couldn't h a v e — M r . Jackson didn't have a key 
16 11 from December 22nd to January 3rd, if I remember Mr. Haws' 
17 testimony right. And as far as c o u n t s — i t looks like 16, 
18 17, both of those, both count 16 and 17 occurred during that 
19 December 22nd through January 3rd period where there was no 
20 access to the tanks. 
7\ T H E COURT: Mlhat about it, counsel? 
22 MR. LEE: Your Honor, the State has presented 
23 II evidence that's based on the defendant's admission that he 
24 took fuel once a week and during the time that he was 
25 working on the project. N ow the jury doesn't have to 
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convict him on all of the counts, and maybe those are counts 
that they won't convict him on. But there are some others. 
There are at least four eyeu/itnesses that saw him taking 
fuel, or at least circumstances evidence that he was taking 
fuel on two separate observations. 
As far as authorization, we have the defendant's 
word against Mr. Haws# word and the jury is entitled to 
decide who they1re going to believe. They're the ones that 
are going to give weight to the evidence and credibility to 
the witness. It's a jury question that should go to the 
jury as to who they believe on those things. We've not had 
a chance to cross examine Mr. Jackson as to what he said. 
THE COURT: Let me just ask you, counsel. Let's 
quit horsing around. He said he couldn't have taken any gas 
because they were all locked up. He didn't have the key. 
I'm talking about between December 22nd and January 3rd. 
MR. LEE: Well that's right, Your Honor. Maybe 
those counts ought to be dismissed, but not the whole thing. 
COURT RULING 
THE COURT: I think they're dismissed. The motion 
is granted as to counts No.— 
MR. WINWARD: Now, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Wait a minute. 
THE COURT: As to Count No. 16, Count No. 17, 
based upon the testimony here, there couldn't have been a 
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theft during that period of time from the evidence I've 
heard. 
Go ahead. 
MR. WINWARD: The other part of my motion—I mean 
those two are particularly a standout and pretty straight 
forward. As for the other 14 counts, where we are at now, 
the other 14 counts the State has to prove, make some kind 
of showing of intent. They have to make some kind of 
showing that Mr. Jackson—there was no way that Mr. Jackson 
knew that he wasn't authorized. Mr. Haws, in his testimony, 
specifically said that he never told them that he couldn't. 
He said the general rule was if it was for company use, you 
could use the fuel. Mr. Jackson was aware of that rule and, 
in fact, had used fuel with Mr. Haws' permission, according 
to his testimony, on at least one occasion. 
They have no evidence of intent. All they have is 
a general rule that was out there at this employment site, 
and not only that, everyone is saying that he's offering to 
pay for it, if there was a misunderstanding. There's 
nothing there for intent. There's nothing in these charges 
that show intent• 
The state hasn't made a prima facie case on those 
claims, Your Honor. 
MR. LEE: Your Honor, if I could be heard on that 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
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PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT 
BY MR. LEE: Your Honorf a question of intent is 
shown by the way the defendant acted each time those people 
saw him. How he pulled it out and threw it under the truck. 
Why would he do that if he was authorized? That shows he 
was not authorized. 
THE COURT: You got the last witness; didn't she 
testify to that? She said he took it over and put it and 
hung it up. 
MR. LEE: That's true, Your Honor. We have that, 
also. But on many occasions I think we have behavior by Mr. 
Jackson that indicates he wasn't authorized. We also have 
the unequivocal testimony from Mr. Don Haws and he didn't 
give him authority to do that. He says he let him have it 
on one coax, Your Honor. He also stated that he was 
contract labor on the Burr Trail, that he was a security 
guard and he wasn't paid subsistence for, he stated. All 
those things need to be taken under consideration by the 
jury. 
It's Harper's fuel. He obtained control over it. 
The question is whether it was not authorized. We have Mr. 
Haws saying it was not authorized; we have Mr. Jackson 
saying there was. 
THE COURT: We have Mr. Haws saying this, there 
could have been a mistake. He says that. There could have 
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been a mistake. What does that do? 
Let roe just ask you, counsel, suppose I let this 
go to the jury and they convict him? 
MR. LEE: That's utfiat u/e are asking them to do. 
THE COURT: Yeah. Suppose they do convict him and 
then suppose they come in and make a motion for a judgment, 
notwithstanding the verdict, on the basis there's not 
8 II adequate evidence here to convict him under any 
9 circumstances? 
io MR. LEE: Your Honor, you'll have to make that 
n decision. I don't think we're horsing around, Your Honor. 
12 I'm trying the very best I can. I'm trying to show the case 
n as best I can. I think we made a prima facie case. 
u THE COURT: Well, do you have anything else, 
15 counsel? 
16 MR. LEE: Well, I think vi/e have got to—must have 
17 to send it to the jury, Your Honor, and request that it be. 
18 COURT ORDER AND FINDINGS 
19 THE COURT: Well, I don't. I'm sorry, but I just 
20 don't. I feel that if I allowed the jury to take this out 
21 and render a verdict on this evidence that I've heard today 
22 that I would have no alternative but to dismiss the case 
23 after on the basis of I've just don't think there's a prima 
24 facia case. I just don't feel, with the evidence I've 
25 heard, there's a prima facie case to believe the defendant 
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is guilty. I haven't -even been convinced in my mind that 
there's adequate evidence to allou/ it to go to the jury 
after hearing the testimony I've had. 
This case is dismissed. I'm sorry, but that's the 
way it looks to me. Bring the jury in. 
[BAILIFF RESPONDED] 
PROCEEDINGS CONTINUED WITH JURY PRESENT 
THE COURT: The record should indicate the jury 
has returned the parties are present with counsel. 
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, while you were 
out there has been a motion made before the Court and I have 
conscientiously listened to the motions. In my opinion 
there's not adequate evidence before this Court to allow 
this case to go to the jury. I don't believe in all honesty 
and fairness, that this man can be convicted based upon the 
evidence that I've heard and so I take it away from you and 
I have dismissed the case with prejudice. This case is 
over. 
I appreciate your being here. I appreciate your 
courtesy, but that's my feeling in this matter and that's a 
responsibility that I have under these cases. 
If I allowed this case to go to the jury, in my 
opinion, and you did convict him, I would be compelled to 
set aside your verdict and under those circumstances I can't 
conscientiously allow you to take that and go through this 
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1 II on the evidence I've heard, so I appreciate your being here, 
2 |l but this case is dismissed. 
3 Thank you very much. 
* Be sure and talk to the Clerk so you get paid for 
5 your allowance. 
* Thank you, folks. I hope that you have a better 
7 appreciation for our system under these circumstances and I 
8 hope you have an opportunity to see what u/e do and how we 
9 act. 
io I congratulate counsel for the efforts they've 
ii made, but that's how I see it and that's the way it is. 
12 Thank you very much, folks, and this case and this 
13 court will be in recess. 
14 [WHEREUPON THE ABOVE ENTITLED PROCEEDINGS WERE 
15 COMPLETED] 
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